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The Implications of Kelley
from the Defense's
Perspective
by Edward S. Digges, Jr.

na landmark decision, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has ruled in
Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., that
manufacturers and marketers of "small,
cheap handguns sometimes referred to as
Saturday Night Specials, regularly used in
criminal activity" may be held "absolutely"
liable for an innocent person's gunshot injuries caused by a third party's criminal
use of the product. This will be true not
because "such" handguns are "unreasonably dangerous" within the meaning of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts or because the manufacturing of
handguns is "abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activity" within the meaning
of Sections 519-520 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, but because in the
court's view the society of Maryland bespeaks a policy that justifies the creation of
a cause of action that will impose such absolute liability upon the manufacturers and
marketers of "such" handguns. The decision is prospective in the sense that such
a handgun must have had a retail sale to a
member of the public after the date of the
mandate on the Kelley decision.
With regard to the apparent object of
the judicially sculpted cause of action,
the court, interestingly, acknowledges that
"there is no clear-cut established definition
of a Saturday Night Special, although there
are various characteristics which are considered in placing a handgun into that category." The court does recite "relevant factors" to be considered by the trier of fact
(virtually always going to be a jury) in determining whether the conceptual prereq-

I

uisites for this cause of action have been
met: "barrel length, concealability, cost,
quality of materials, quality of manufacture, accuracy, reliability, whether it has
been banned from import by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and other
related characteristics." As might be expected, this recitation closely resembles a
dictionary definition of a Saturday Night
Special-i.e., "any small, cheap, shortbarreled handgun that is readily available,
and that is also lightweight and easily
hidden".
Critically, it is precisely this definitional
situation which poses the dilemma for
manufacturers and marketers of handguns
in view of the impreciseness with which a
product liability case proceeds to decision
before a jury. In short, product liability
cases, such as what will evolve here, often
involve severe injuries tied to the use of a
particular product and, therefore, proceed
within a courtroom environment where
there is strong sympathy for the party sustaining the injuries (here, it will by definition always be an innocent victim of criminal activity). This environment is then
enhanced by a recitation oflaw by the trial
judge for purposes of the deliberative process that renders a finding ofliability relatively easy. Accordingly, when also injecting the human element reflected in studies
that most jurors are pre-conditioned to
think that on balance it will hurt a corporate defendant linsurer far less to award
something to the injured person than to
turn that person away with nothing, the
Kelley decision's message is almost certain

to have the effect of not only precluding
the manufacture and distribution of the
type of handgun known as a Saturday
Night Special but also precluding in due
time most types of handguns. Of course,
that result might have been the unwritten
intent of the opinion's author.
Legally speaking, the court in Kelley has
created a cause of action which will be articulated to jurors for decision-making
purposes along the following lines:
You are charged under Maryland law
that a (manufacturer) (seller) of a Saturday Night Special type of handgun
which he knows or reasonably should
know is principally to be used for
[criminal activity] [or] [activity which
has little or no legitimate (use) (value)
in today's society] is responsible for injuries caused by persons who use that
product for [criminal] [or] [an activity
which has little or no legitimate (use)
(value) in today's society]. In deciding whether a handgun is a Saturday
Night Special type, you should consider the following factors: (recitation
of aforementioned factors).
As a result, the Kelley decision has the
"legitimate" handgun industry reeling because of the practical implication of being
held liable for injuries resulting from the
criminal misuse of "legitimate" handguns.
The "legitimate" handgun industry has no
difficulty with being subjected to the traditional product liability theories even
within the context of their rapid evolution
- that is, being held responsible for any
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defect in the handgun itself, such as having a safety mechanism that fails under certain circumstances, or having a tendency
to misfire, or having a trigger structure
that easily catches on foreign objects and
thereby causes an accidental discharge. It
simply quarrels with the judicial policymaking that will hold it responsible for a
third party's deliberate misuse of its product. As an aside, statistics of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms seem to
suggest that criminals prefer to use high
quality .38 and .357 caliber revolvers (the
same type of handgun as used by police
organizations) over the so-called Saturday
Night Special in any event. To add another dimension, the underpinning rationale for the Kelley decision suggests
that there may be room in the cause of action for other types of analogous instrumentalities-e.g., a sawed-ofT shotgun or
the switchblade knife. Only time will tell,
however!
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ual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in
any significant way and is subjected to
questioning.'" Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at
609,490 A.2d at 766 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436,478 (1966)). Thus, the court reasoned
that in order to find a violation ofMiranda,
it must be found "(a) that appellant was interrogated; (b) that the interrogation occurred while he was in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom; and (c) that
appellant was not properly advised of his
Miranda rights." Hamilton, 62 Md. App.
at 609, 490 A.2d at 766.
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The court quickly found that the acquaintance's conversations with the defendant amounted to an interrogation because he was an agent of the state sent
expressly to question the defendant about
the murder. Additionally, it is clear that
the defendant was not properly advised of
his Miranda rights. However, the second
element, that of custody, was missing.
"Only if the accused is in a situation
where there are inherently compelling
pressures to respond to interrogation are
Miranda warnings required." Hamilton,
62 Md. App. at 611, 490 A.2d at 767. The
court discussed the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293 (1966) in reaching its decision. In that
case the Court held that the use of testimony of a government informer concerning conversations between the informer
and the defendant did not violate the defendant's fifth amendment rights. "[S]ince
at least as long as 1807, when ChiefJustice
Marshall first gave attention to the matter
in the trial of Aaron Burr, all have agreed
that a necessary element of compulsory
self-incrimination is some kind of compulsion.... " /d. at 304 (footnote omitted),
quoted in Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 612,
490 A.2d at 767. The conversations in
Hoffa, however, took place in the defendant's hotel suite and not in a jail cell.
Judge Alpert then turned to the Court's
decision in United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264 (1980).
[T]he Supreme Court, while holding
that statements made to a police informant after indictment of the ac-

cused and while the accused was incarcerated were inadmissible on Sixth
Amendment grounds, addressed Fifth
Amendment concerns in dicta. Citing
Hoffa for authority, the Court noted
that "the Fifth Amendment has not
been held to be implicated by the use
of undercover Government agents before charges are filed because of the absence of the potential of compulsion."
Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 613, 490 A.2d
at 768 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Henry, 447 U.S. at 272).
Although the environment involved in
Hamilton, namely the confines of a prison
cell, leads to thoughts of custody, the court
concluded that there was nothing coercive
in the casual questioning of Hamilton by
Fowler. The court noted that Hamilton
"spoke with Fowler of his own volition,
was not required to stay and continue the
conversation and could have left Fowler at
any time." Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 615,
490 A.2d at 769. The court cautioned that
"[w]e must not forget that 'Miranda . ..
was aimed not at self-crimination generally
. . . but at compelled self-incriminationthe inherent coercion of the custodial, incommunicado, third-degree questioning
process.'" Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 616,
490 A.2d at 769 (quoting Cummings v.
State, 27 Md. App. 361, 364, 341 A.2d
294,297, cert. denied, 276 Md. 740 (1975)).
Thus, the court concluded "that despite
appellant's incarceration the interrogation
was not custodial." Hamilton, at 615, 490
A.2d at 769.
Before Hamilton, the "jail plant" situa-

